

Security Information
IAC-D-57/1
1 May 1953

ENCLOSURE "A"

LIST OF INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES REVEALED IN THE PREPARATION
OF NIE's 47, 55/1 AND 58
(in order of priority)

Several intelligence deficiencies were revealed in the preparation of NIE's 47, 55/1 and 58. These deficiencies are of varying degree and importance. For the most part, they are related to three general questions:

- a. Sino-Soviet support of the war effort in Korea;
- b. The nature of certain attitudes within Communist China;
- c. The nature of Sino-Soviet political relations.

Outlined below are specific points on which NIE's 47, 55/1, and 58 were weakened by the lack of adequate intelligence.

A. The Sino-Soviet War Effort in Korea

*1. What are Communist intentions with respect to an armistice in Korea? Is there any divergence of view, Chinese and Soviet, on this question?

2. What is the Sino-Soviet capability to support: (a) intensified hostilities in Korea, and (b) a general war in the Far East?

*a. Communist military stockpiles. Where are Soviet Far East stockpiles located, and what is their level? To what extent does Soviet support of the Korean war entail a drain upon Soviet Far East stockpiles? Upon Soviet Far East production? Upon shipments from Communist Europe? How large, and where, are Communist China's aviation POL stockpiles?

* There is little or no reliable intelligence at present on these questions. Despite recognized collection difficulties, more reliable intelligence is essential to the production of meaningful estimates.

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*b. Chinese Communist military production. Of POL?
Of munitions? Of transport equipment?

**c. The effect to date of the Korean war. On the
viability of the Chinese Communist economy? On the rehabi-
litation and expansion of productive capacity? On the economic
dependence upon the USSR, and on the terms under which Communist
China receives military and economic aid from the USSR?

**d. What is the amphibious capability of the Soviet Far
East forces?

*3. What is the role of the Soviet Air Force in the Korean
war and the CCAF? What combat experience have CCAF pilots actually
had? What degree of combat proficiency have CCAF pilots demonstrated
in Korea?

**4. What staff responsibility relationships exist in the joint
Sino-Soviet military direction of the Korean war?

**5. What trends exist in Communist China's armed force mobili-
zation programs? Are the armed forces growing larger, smaller,
or remaining static in their numerical strength?

B. Popular Attitudes within Communist China

**1. What attitudes exist within the CCP, the Army, and the
general population regarding:

a. Support of the regime?

b. The USSR? US? Japan? Chinese Nationalists?

**2. How important are such attitudes? To what extent must
the regime consider them in determining and implementing policy?

** Some intelligence is available on these questions, but the
receipt of more reliable information and an augmentation of
analytical effort would enable the IAC to make better estimates
than is now possible.

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C. The Nature of Sino-Soviet Political Relations

*1. The influence which the USSR exerts in the key centers of the Chinese Communist regime.

a. In the regime's security agencies? Army? Party? Government? Economy?

b. What key personalities in the regime, if any, may be said to be "Moscow men"?

**2. The influence (political, economic and military) which the USSR exerts in the border areas of Communist China.

a. What is the nature of political relations among Communist China, the USSR, and Outer Mongolia?

b. What influence does the USSR (or Outer Mongolia) exert in Manchuria? in Inner Mongolia? in Sinkiang?

**3. The relationships which exist between Communist China and the USSR concerning primary influence in:

a. The Communist doctrine of revolution in Asia?

b. The strategic direction of Communist activities in Southeast Asia? in Japan? in North Korea?

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Memo to NSC Policy Planning Board, 24 August 1953,
subject: Revision of NSC-29

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